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1. Introduction
Almost three decades ago, Spiro Latsis (1972; also Latsis, 1976a,b) forcefully argued that the
neoclassical research program in the theory of the firm was degenerating (in the sense of
Lakatos, 1970), since it did not produce new corroborated predictions.    Moreover, oligopoly
interaction represented insoluble puzzles for that research program, because substantive
rationality was not sufficient to close oligopoly models.   Although he did not argue that the
behavioral perspectives on the firm existing at that time constituted a serious rival research
program, he did argue that the serious problems that confronted the neoclassical research
program should lead towards more serious consideration of bounded rationality (henceforth,
“BR”) in the theory of the firm (see also Loasby, 1971). Although not dressed in the
Lakatosian methodological garb that Latsis chose for his arguments, Simon (1976, 1979)
made rather similar arguments, often also concentrating on the ad hoc nature of “orthodox”
oligopoly models. Of course, he, too, argued that work on the firm based on behavioral
insights would ultimately supplant the traditional neoclassical research program.
It is somewhat ironic that at about the time that Latsis and Simon were launching their
complaints, serious approaches to various aspects of the theory of the firm that all appeared to
be solidly based on bounded rationality were mushrooming. Thus, team theory (Marschak and
Radner, 1972), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1971), and the evolutionary theory of
the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1973) all appeared in the beginning of the nineteen-seventies
(although their roots go much further back).  These, still flourishing, approaches all started
from bounded rationality.  And the motivation for such a starting point was that neoclassical
theory of the firm and its behavioral starting point in substantive rationality excluded concern
with such vital phenomena as incomplete contracts, the role of organizational structure and
organizational routines.  Today, many  if not all  economists of organization would likely
agree that BR is important to the study of economic organization (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988,
1992).  Indeed, some argue that it is indispensable, that is, a necessary assumption in the
theory of economic organization (Williamson, 1996; MacLeod, 2000).  References to the need
to draw more on psychological research are quite common now, even among the economics
profession’s foremost symbol manipulators (e.g., Holmström and Tirole, 1989; Lazear, 1991).
Thus, a cursory glance at contemporary organizational economics may easily convey the
impression that Latsis and Simon’s lessons have been absorbed, and that organizational
economists have realized the need to place BR truly centerstage at their theorizing.  From a
Lakatosian perspective, it may look as if BR has now attained the status of  a hard core
assumption.
However, closer inspection, to be undertaken in the ensuing pages, of the use and role of BR
in contemporary organizational economics reveals that this is not the case, in spite of frequent
invocations of BR.  The notion of BR that is applied by organizational economists is, I shall
argue, a decidedly “thin” one in the sense that the modeler does not stray very far from the
safe path of substantive (maximizing) rationality.  In fact, in contemporary treatments, BR is
little more than a mainly rhetorical device that serves to lend credence to other ideas that are
more central in the analysis, such as contractual incompleteness.  I shall argue that this has the
two unfortunate consequences that BR is neither necessary, nor sufficient in the theory of
economic organization.  More precisely, first, thin BR is almost indistinguishable from full
rationality, and it is unclear what it adds with respect to behavior that could not have been
2added equally well by a more sophisticated treatment of informational and computational
constraints framed in the context of full rationality.  Second, quite little is added with respect
to understanding economic organization by including considerations of BR, as recent debate
on the foundations of organizational economics suggest (section 2, “Bounded Rationality in
the Contemporary Economics of Organization: Function, Status and Debates”). Ironically,
contemporary users of the assumption BR appear to confront somewhat similar kind of
problems that Latsis (1972) pointed to in the “orthodox” research program in the theory of the
firm: The use of the assumption does not appear to yield extra intellectual “value-added.”   
As I have suggested elsewhere (Foss 2001a), the problem is fundamentally one of adopting a
minimal notion of BR that while consistent with Herbert Simon’s overall vision, at least on a
rhetorical level, can also be made compatible with strict modeling assumptions in game
theoretic mainstream economics (see also Schlicht, 1990).  In contrast, a major purpose of the
present paper is to sketch the contours of  an organizational economics that places BR more
centrally than what is presently the case, while remaining loyal to some of the overall ideas of
organizational economics, notably the idea of economizing with transaction costs as key to
explaining contracts and governance structures.  It turns out that numerous research strategies
are possible.  Particular attention is devoted to a program based on the well-established, if not
completely unproblematic, literature on cognitive and judgmental biases, associated with such
names as Tversky, Kahneman, Thaler and others (section 3, “Towards Richer Notions of
Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization: Research Strategy and Examples”).  I
end with some methodological reflections (section 4, “Discussion: Transaction Costs,
Efficiency, and Social Learning”).
2. Bounded Rationality in the Contemporary Economics of
Organization: Function, Status, and Debates
Bounded Rationality: Function
Economists’ thinking about the role of rationality (bounded as well as full) in the context of
the theory of the firm goes back at least to at least the 1950s and likely earlier. It is hard to
underestimate the importance for the development of economics and organization theory of
economists being quizzical for five decades about how much sense it makes to ascribe
rationality to the multi-person firm, under which circumstances this can be done, etc.
Although virtually all of the initial debates concerned how much rationality could legitimately
be ascribed to firms’ market behavior (Alchian, 1950; Penrose, 1952; Machlup, 1967), the
focus of contemporary debate has changed from market behavior in competitive situations to
issues of economic organization, notably the choice of efficient firm boundaries (e.g., Dow,
1987; Hart, 1990; Radner, 1996; Tirole, 1999).
There can be little doubt that bounded rationality is perceived of as crucially important by
many contemporary writers on economic organization. Oliver Williamson is not only the
flagbearer of the modern literature, but also the most outspoken proponent of the necessity to
include BR in the economics of organization.   “But for bounded rationality,” he argues (1996:
36), “all issues of organization collapse in favor of comprehensive contracting of either
Arrow-Debreu or mechanism design kinds.”  While the latter kind of analyses may contain
useful insights in, for example, the dependence of allocation on the distribution of information,
3there are many things they cannot do, such as explaining the existence and boundaries of
alternative governance structures.  For this, the notion of BR is a necessary one.
It is quite striking that a notion that is claimed to constitute a necessary behavioral assumption
is never defined with much precision in the economics of organization literature. One may
speculate that this has to do with the virtual absence in modern economics of a specific,
affirmative, generally agreed-upon program for research in BR.  Nevertheless, a multitude of
differing interpretations of BR do exist, some of them extremely formal (Rubinstein 1998), so
it certainly is possible to adopt some precise definition of BR as a foundational assumption in
the economics of organization literature.  This is, however, never done. Williamson usually
confines himself to quoting Simon’s famous dictum from the preface of Administrative
Behavior that BR refers to man being “intendedly rational, but limitedly so.” Some writers
make hasty reference to Simonian information processing arguments (Hart 1990: 698;
Schwartz 1992: 80). Thus, if agents do not have the mental capacity to think through the
whole decision tree  for example, in complicated bilateral trading relations , it seems
reasonable to assume that some of the branches of the tree (such as those relating to some
future uses of assets) cannot be represented in a contract; the contract is left incomplete. In a
central chapter (5, “Bounded Rationality and Private Information”) in their well-known
textbook, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 128) define bounded rationality as a matter of
”[l]imited foresight, imprecise language, the costs of calculating solutions and the costs of
writing down a plan.” They go on to develop at length the implications of this in terms of
imperfect contracts and subsequent problems of imperfect commitment between contractual
parties.  However, they, too, do not develop or truly explain their definition of bounded
rationality.
The reason why economists of organization are less than eager to adopt precise, constraining
definitions of what BR may mean with respect to individual behavior likely is that they simply
do not see any reasons for adopting such definitions.  Williamson is quite explicit here.  He
notes that “[e]conomizing on bounded rationality takes two forms.  One concerns decision
processes and the other involves governance structures.  The use of heuristic problem-solving
… is a decision process response” (Williamson, 1985, p. 46).  The latter “form” is not central,
however, in transaction cost economics, which “ … is principally concerned … with the
economizing consequences of assigning transactions to governance structures in a
discriminating way.”1
Now, it is not immediately clear, first, why there is a need to make a distinction between the
“two forms” of economizing on bounded rationality, and, second, what is meant by saying that
one of these forms “involve governance structures.”  However, when seen in the context of the
comparative-static approach of transaction cost economics and when the explanatory purposes
of transaction cost economics are kept in mind, the possibility of making the distinction as
well as associating economizing on bounded rationality with governance becomes much
clearer.  Thus, Williamson is interested in making use of bounded rationality for the purpose
                                                          
1 Thus, Simon seems to be justitied in his critique that “… the new institutional economics has not
drawn heavily from the empirical work in organizations and decision-making for its auxiliary
assumptions” (Simon 1991: 27).
4of explaining the existence and boundaries of firms rather than for the purposes of explaining
administrative behavior, as in Simon (1947).2  He is not interested in the issue of what “to tell
Miss Jones on Monday morning” (Loasby, 1995) in response to some contingency; thus, he is
not interested in BR as a “decision process response.” What Williamson says he is interested
in is, of course, how BR help to explain the choice between governance structures.
However, if that is the case, one wonders why it is necessary to exclude a concern with
decision process responses, since one might expect different governance structures to exhibit
different decision process properties.  In fact, Williamson’s main interest in BR is to do with
its role in explaining incomplete contracts and therefore the hold-up problem around which his
thinking revolves. The interest in governance structures as ex post mechanisms for
coordination and dispute settlement is derived from this.  For the purpose of explaining why
contracts are incomplete, Williamson apparently thinks that it is not necessary to model BR
itself; it may be asserted as a “background assumption” that while vital  indeed, necessary
 does not need to be explicated itself.  Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p.128), as well as most
other economists of organization who invoke BR, adopt the same procedure.
Although BR is formally allowed for in these stories, agents are supposed to deal with BR in a
substantively rational manner by choosing efficient governance structures or ownership
arrangements on an ex ante basis.  In this way, it is possible to have a halfway house in which
BR briefly enters, leaving one essential trace, contractual incompleteness, in an otherwise
largely orthodox theoretical structure, but is essentially suppressed for the remaining part of
the story. Thus, at least in contract theory and transaction cost economics, it is never BR per se
that is modeled in the sense of beginning from explicitly stated assumptions about human
information processing and perceptions and then examining the implications for contracting
and choice of governance structure; there isn’t any perceived need to do this.3
It is therefore not surprising that although organizational economics may have been one of the
first areas where BR was systematically applied in theorizing, modern developments have not
gone beyond early contributions Simon (1951), Marschak and Radner (1972) and Williamson
(1975) with respect to their use of BR.  Instead of examining BR per se, theorists have
examined the multitude of implications of situations where BR is present. From the position of
economizing with scholarly effort, this may be seen a considerable advantage: The theorist can
still derive interesting implications for organizational design although he has been rather
parsimonious with respect to characterizing the agents whose behaviors the design will
influence.
                                                          
2 Williamson (1985) does argues that bounds on rationality may be alleviated by means of the
“adaptive, sequential decision-making” characteristic of organizations, but never goes into this in any
detail.
3  Team theory represents a partial exception to this; team theorists do make explicit assumptions
about, notably, information-processing capabilities (see Marschak and Radner 1972; Sah and Stiglitz
1985; Camacho and Persky 1988; Carter 1995).  Much of the critique in this paper of organizational
economics does not apply to team theory.
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Although there is thus a considerable discrete charm to the use of BR in modern organizational
economics, there are also many reasons to be uncomfortable with the way it is applied and
used.  From the point of view of the organizational scholar, the lack of concern with decision
processes means that the important possibility that bounds on rationality may be endogenous
to organization is not inquired into, as Loasby (1995) noted.  From the point of view of the
formalist economics scholar, the use of an ultimately ad hoc, exogeneously given constraint on
the complete contracting benchmark must ultimately stand out as less than satisfactory; he will
wish contractual incompleteness to be endogenously derived in a well specified model rather
than merely being postulated by means of a rhetorical appeal to BR.
Since it is the latter, rather than the former, kind of scholars who increasingly dominate
organizational economics, it is perhaps not much of a surprise that the use, or at least
invocation, of the notion of bounded rationality may actually have declined over the last
decade and a half.4  Organization economics has developed into a highly formal and axiomatic
enterprise, and bounded rationality has a bad reputation of only being given to formalization if
that formalization is fundamentally ad hoc and the axiomatic basis is unclear or non-existent.
That reputation may not be entirely justified (Rubinstein 1998), but most economists of
organization (particularly contract theorists) certainly act as if it is justified.  The prominent
contract theorist Oliver Hart (1990, p. 700-1) probably sums up the sentiments of many formal
economists when he argues that
… I do not think that bounded rationality is necessary for a theory of organizations.
This is fortunate because developing a theory of bounded rationality in a bilateral or
multilateral setting seems even more complicated than developing such a theory at
the individual level; and the latter task has already proved more than enough for
economists to handle.5
The reason that BR may not be “necessary for a theory of organizations” is that what it
primarily does in the theory  namely, rationalize contractual incompleteness and therefore
the inefficient investment levels that are centerstage in much contract theory (Grossman and
Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995)   can be done more elegantly by asymmetric information
assumptions, particularly the assumption that investments in a relation are unverifiable by a
third party (e.g., a judge).   Thus, contrary to Williamson (1985), BR may not appear to be a
necessary assumption.
Still, however, it is not immediately apparent why substituting ad hoc asymmetric information
assumptions for ad hoc BR assumptions is much of an improvement (except that the former
lends itself to more easy formal treatment).  Moreover, BR may well underlie asymmetric
information.  For example, the reason why the judge in Hart’s (1995) story is not able to
                                                          
4  I have no hard data to support this claim, however.  A piece of impressionistic evidence is that in
Williamson’s work, bounded rationality loomed larger in Williamson (1975) than it does in Williamson
(1996).
5  It should perhaps be added that Hart’s (1990) notion of what constitutes a “theory of organizations”
is quite limited:  It is a theory of the boundaries of the firm!
6“verify” the investment levels undertaken by plaintiff and defendant may conceivably turn on
BR: The parties and the judge may hold different cognitive categories, which is a matter of BR
rather than asymmetric information, the case may present such a mass of information (not
entirely unrealistic in commercial disputes) that much information because of less than perfect
information processing remain unverified, etc. In fact, even formal contract theorists
(including Professor Hart) continue to invoke BR.  Thus, BR continues to enter organizational
economics reasoning in a loose background sort of way, in which it lends credence to
exogeneously imposing constraints on the feasible contracting space, but is not modeled itself.
It continues to supply the rhetorical function of lending intuitive support to the notion of
incomplete contracts.
The Incomplete Contract Controversy: The Irrelevance of Bounded
Rationality?
A recent debate between Tirole (1999) and Maskin and Tirole (1999a,b) and Hart and Moore
(1999) on the foundations of the theory of incomplete contracts and its organizational
ramifications (with related contributions from Hart, 1990; Kreps, 1996;  Segal 1999; Radner
1996) is extremely instructive with respect to understanding the true status of BR in the
modern economics of organization. As the name indicates, the debate concerns whether
satisfactory foundations for incomplete contracts are offered in the works of Oliver Hart and
his colleagues and students theory (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990;
Hart, 1995).  The main critics have been Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (Maskin and Tirole,
1999a,b; Tirole, 1999).  However, the ramifications of the debate are wider, and include the
role of BR in organizational economics, perhaps including transaction cost economics.
Organizational issues have largely motivated the upsurge in incomplete contract modeling
during the last decade.  In fact, the founding incomplete contract paper, namely Grossman and
Hart (1986), was explicitly motivated by an attempt to model the Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978) and Williamson (1979) asset specificity approaches to the scope of the firm, using
modeling conventions and insights already developed in (complete contracting) agency theory
(particularly Holmström, 1982).    However, the outcome of that attempt was essentially a new
theory. This is because Klein, Crawford and Alchian as well as Williamson have unforeseen
contingencies at the heart of their stories: It is the haggling that arises when contracts are
pushed outside of their self-enforcing range by unforeseen contingencies that is the main
problem here. What matters is the ex post action. In contrast, most of the incomplete
contracting approach assumes that ex post bargaining is efficient and that actions (e.g., with
respect to investment) are taken immediately after the contract is signed.  Thus, what drives
these models are misaligned ex ante incentives, particularly with respect to investment in
vertical buyer-supplier relationships.
A problem then is to motivate what may cause such misalignment. The kind of (complete)
contracting studied in the mechanism design literature or its close cousin, agency theory, also
won’t do.  Under this kind of contracting, agents can 1) perfectly foresee contingencies, 2)
write contracts, and 3) enforce these.  This means that parties to an ”investment game” can
simply write contracts contingent on the levels of investment and payoffs.  The implication is
that in order to dilute investment incentives, some transaction costs relating to assumptions 1)
– 3) not holding true must be invoked.  In other words, some aspects of future trades cannot be
7foreseen and must be left to future negotiation, and/or writing costs mean that writing a
complete contract is seldom optimal, and/or the parties’ valuations are not verifiable by a court
and therefore cannot be contracted over.  The set of feasible contracts is constrained by
transaction costs represented by assumptions 1) and/or 2) and/or 3) above not holding true.
The point of contention in the incomplete contracts controversy is whether transaction costs
arising from the inability to perfectly anticipate or describe all relevant contingencies and
enforce contract terms constrain the set of feasible contracts relative to the complete
contracting benchmark. If this is not the case, transaction costs/considerations of BR are not
sufficient to establish neither the possibility of inefficient investment patterns, nor a role for
ownership (within the particular set-ups adopted in contract theory).   In the eyes of the critics,
the basic problem with the incomplete contract approach is that although valuations are not
verifiable, they may be still be observable by the parties.  This implies that trade may be
conditioned on message games between the parties.  These games are designed ex ante in such
a way that they can effectively describe ex post all the trades that were not described ex ante.
The key to this argument is the assumption (which is routinely made in the incomplete
contracts literature) that parties allocate property rights and choose investments so that their
expected utilities are maximized, knowing (at least probabilistically) how payoffs relate to
allocations of property rights and levels of investment.6  Maskin and Tirole (1999a) then
provide sufficient conditions under which the indescribability of contingencies does not
restrict the payoffs that can be achieved.  This is their ”irrelevance of transaction costs”
theorem. We might as well call it the ”irrelevance of bounded rationality” theorem, since the
problems of being unable to perfectly anticipate or describe all relevant contingencies are BR
problems.
Implications
There are further rounds to the debate than what is summarized here. However, it is not
necessary at this point to go into these to see that something fundamental   which may also
be relevant to Williamsonian transaction cost economics  is at stake here. Maskin and Tirole
(1990a) provide a rigorous demonstration of what exactly it means to choose contractual forms
based on, in Williamson’s terms, ”farsighted contracting,” and still operate with some, albeit
rather limited, notion of BR.  They thus counter those critics, particularly Dow (1987), who
have claimed that organizational economics borders on the inconsistent because it assumes
farsighted contracting and bounded rationality.  There is no logical inconsistency involved in
assuming that payoffs are fully foreseeable, yet parties are ignorant about the sources of that
utility; Savage and Simon may join hands.7
However, another result may cause less celebration by the transaction cost economics and
incomplete contracts camps.  Thus, Maskin and Tirole show that although expected utility
maximization and BR may be aligned, the inclusion of BR in contract economics models make
essentially no difference.  Their “irrelevance of transaction costs/BR” theorem show that the
                                                          
6  In the jargon of the literature, they can perform “dynamic programming,” which essentially is
intertemporal optimization with discounting in a stochastic setting (see Blackwell 1965).
7 For methodological comments on this, see Brousseau and Fares (2000), Foss and Foss (2000), and
Furubotn and Richter (1997).
8set of allocations that can be obtained under complete contracting (i.e., no BR) can also be
obtained under incomplete contracting (i.e., BR is present).  An implication is that incomplete
contract models cannot really do what their proponents assert, namely explain, for example,
the boundaries of the firm (because contractual mechanisms can substitute for ownership).
One may thus be tempted to conclude that not only is BR not necessary in the economics of
organization (since asymmetric information assumptions can also do the job); it isn’t sufficient
either.  However, such a conclusion may well be too hasty.  As David Kreps (1996, p. 565)
laconically observes in a comment on Maskin and Tirole, ”… not everything that is logically
consistent is credulous”.  He argues that the Maskin and Tirole argument (and also the whole
incomplete contracting approach) simply takes rationality too far.  But there is another
problem which stems from trying to combine substantive rationality with respect to some
variables with rationality about other variables that is very bounded indeed.  This is
problematic, because in reality knowledge about the former variables (the expected utility
from the relation) is likely to be dependent upon knowledge about the latter variables (the
sources of the utility). Thus, Maskin and Tirole, and virtually all formal economists of
organization, literally claim that people may be perfectly knowledgeable about the utility that
they may expect from relation, yet basically ignorant about the sources of that utility (or, at
least so ignorant as to not being able to describe it in contracts).8  This may make formal
sense, but it is also very hard to connect to reality, and may ultimately not be a tenable
assumption (see Barzel 2000 on this).
What’s Next?
It is possible to draw three conflicting conclusions from the incomplete contracts controversy.
First, it may be argued that we should drop BR in the economics of organization entirely,
simply because it doesn’t add anything (Posner 1993).  Second, it is possible to argue that the
incomplete contracts controversy merely suggests that existing ways of working with BR are
unproductive, and that slight changes in the way that BR enters models may yield interesting
results.  Third, it may be argued that it should come as no surprise that introducing a version of
BR that is very close to substantive rationality does lead to outcomes that are substantially
different from those that result under substantive rationality.  Therefore, we should examine
wider notions of BR.9
                                                          
8 Whether Williamson also makes this assumption is not entirely clear.  He does argue that “… but for
farsightedness, transaction cost economics would be denied access to one of the most important 'tricks'
in the economist's bag, namely the assumption that economic actors have the ability to look ahead,
discern problems and prospects, and factor these back into the organizational/contractual design.”
(Williamson, 1993: 129).  On the other hand, he never defines “farsightedness” in a precise manner.  It
is not clear whether “farsightedness” in Williamson’s story may be defined as rational expectations (as
in contract theory).  Thanks to Siegwart Lindenberg for drawing my attention to this.
9 Radner (1996) makes similar points.  In a critique of the use of game theoretic mechanism design
models in contract theory, he points to the specific, stringent, and ad hoc assumptions that have to be
made to guarantee determinate results from contract theory models (e.g., particular common priors).
An implication is that the usual charge of ad hoc theorizing against going deeper into BR is not a valid
license for institutionalizing complacency about what other disciplines tell us about human behavior:
Contract theory is characterized by a fair amount of ad hoc theorizing itself.
9Contract theorists have pursued the first and the second strategy, depending on whether they
consider the notion of incomplete contracts interesting. Thus, theorists have tried to rescue the
notion of contractual incompleteness and its implications for economic organization through
alternative routes that while continuing to invoke BR do not take fundamentally take it
seriously.  For example, MacLeod (2000) argues that in realistic situations, contracting costs
may be exponential in the number of tasks.  Thus, trying to make even simple contracts
complete may lead to an explosion in contracting costs.10 Although MacLeod’s argument
rationalizes incomplete contracts by introducing complexity in the form of exponentially
increasing costs of writing contracts, it does not say much about BR.  This is also the case of
the somewhat different arguments of Hart and Moore (1999) and (particularly) Segal (1999),
which proceeds through introducing complexity in the environment faced by agents.11  Both
papers argue that incomplete contracts and inefficient investments may be explained in
environments where complexity is introduced by letting the number of tradable goods
approach infinity and where some aspects of the goods cannot be described. The increase in
complexity means that the benefit of writing an optimal complete contract is reduced, and/or
the costs of writing such a contract rises.  Because trade becomes ex ante incontractible,
inefficient investments result.  These papers put all the explanatory burden on making the
environment more complex than what is the convention in contract theory.  Additional
economic content is gained by making the situation facing an agent more complex  not by
going into more detail about the cognitive characteristics of agents.  Thus, BR is merely a
handy constraint on the feasible contracting space.
 Interestingly, this approach has also been challenged by Maskin and Tirole (1999b), who point
out that while it may establish that trade can break down under certain circumstances because
of the inability to write complete contracts, it does not establish a role for property rights (and
therefore firms).  In order to so, additional and somewhat ad hoc assumptions (e.g., that the
parties are risk neutral) are necessary. In fact, they argue that ”…these assumptions are the
lynchpins of the property rights literature, rather than the unforeseeability of future
contingencies.” (1999b, p. 140; emph. in original).  Considerations of (this kind of) BR still do
not make much of a difference with respect to economic content; introducing very watered
down versions of BR does not seem to lead any real intellectual gain.  The remaining part of
this paper considers the alternative strategy(ies) of not treating BR as merely an ad hoc
constraint on trading possibilities, but rather starting “from man as he is” (Coase’s 1984, p. 31)
or more precisely, what psychological research tells us about this.
                                                          
10 In the specific multi-tasking set up that Macleod adopts and assuming that it costs one cent to write a
clause, with two tasks and two cost and performance levels, the contract is inexpensive (0,16 USD).
However, with only five tasks and five cost and performance levels, the contract costs are 100.000 USD.
And with fifteen tasks and five cost and performance levels, contracting costs are 10 million trillion
USD.
11 Segal (1999: 74) justifies this by arguing that  “… any attempt to model bounded rationality in a
simple environment is doomed to fall into the trap of describing decision makers as either ‘completely
dumb’ or ‘perfectly rational.’ Neither is an attractive alternative for modeling ‘transaction costs.’  It is
only in environments reflecting the real world’s complexities that an intermediate region of ‘bounded
rationality’ emerge.” However, the real problem with contract theory may rather be that is has tried to
model agents as being both “completely dumb” and “perfectly rational” at the same time (Foss and
Foss, 2000).
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3. Towards Richer Notions of Bounded Rationality in the
Economics of Organization: Research Strategy and Examples
Many writers have observed that to the extent that BR enters contemporary economics, it is in
rather “thin” forms (Schlicht, 1990; Akerlof, 1991; Lindenberg, 1990; Lane et al., 1996;
Furubotn and Richter, 1997; Macleod, 2000; Furubotn, 1999, 2001).  And although quite a
number of interesting attempts to incorporate richer notions of BR in organizational
economics exist (e.g., Williamson, 1998; Mookerjee, 1998; Gifford, 1999; Malcomson and
Macleod, 1999; Furubotn, 2001), it is still a minority of organizational economists who take
an interest in this.  That is understandable.
First, “richer notions of BR” refer to taking into account the wider consequences of imperfect
information processing in terms of the strategies or rules that agents may follow to cope with
their imperfect computational capabilities, the cognitive frames for representing reality they
construct, and the cognitive biases and errors they suffer from.  However, this involves going
into vast and complicated areas where economists can claim no particular competence,
notably social and cognitive psychology.  It means being much more explicit about the
internal make-up of agents.  Second, taking findings in cognitive psychology seriously seems
to imply a break with a number of assumptions and modeling principles that are fundamental
to at least the formal economist.  For example, subjective expected utility theory is
contradicted by psychological research on framing effects.  Other basic notions, such as
independence of payoff utilities from the payoffs of others as well as the path through the
game tree, irrelevance of labeling, common prior beliefs, and backward and forward induction
are problematic in the light of experimental evidence from cognitive psychology (Camerer,
1998).  Third, the psychological literature identifies so many effects and mechanisms that this
in itself challenges the bounded rationality of researchers.
However, those who believe that the time is ripe for more seriously considering the
implications of cognitive psychology for economic organization have reason to be optimistic.
The major journals are regularly featuring papers that somehow incorporate a psychological
finding or examines how it challenges the orthodoxy; the Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
(1990) paper is a striking example.  Although much of this research is experimental in nature,
papers that formally model findings of cognitive psychology (and do so in the context of
economic organization) are increasingly common (e.g., Mookerjee, 1998; Gifford, 1999).
However, research efforts are scattered and there is not much of an attempt to define a
modeling strategy, perhaps much of a recognition that many strategies are possible.  The
following discusses a modeling strategy that while taking account of central findings in
cognitive psychology, keeps the fundamentals of the economics of organization, that is, an
economizing orientation, a comparative contractual perspective, and an emphasis on
transaction costs as key to the explanation of economic organization.12
                                                          
12 Thus, I refrain from discussion the evolutionary/capabilities/etc. theory of the firm, although
evolutionary considerations creep in in section 4.
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A Modeling Strategy
A possible modeling strategy for how to incorporate richer notions of BR in the economics of
organization has recently been sketched by Williamson (1998).  He argues that the many
ramifications of bounded rationality should be explored with a view to first identify those
regularities in decision-making that differ from the classical model of von Neumann-
Morgenstern-Savage, then work out the implications of these regularities for efficient
organization, and finally fold these into the organizational design (Williamson, 1998, p. 18).
The implication is that the efficiency questions of the economics of organization may usefully
be reformulated, relying on thick BR models, so that “… organization can and should be
regarded as an instrument for utilizing varying cognitive and behavioral propensities to best
advantage” (1998, p. 12). A limitation of Williamson’s (1998) paper is that he seems mostly
intent on demonstrating that findings of cognitive psychology are entirely consistent with
“[t]he transaction cost economics triple for describing human actors  bounded rationality,
farsighted contracting, and opportunism.”  Therefore, he is not very specific about what
exactly to do with these findings.
However, one interpretation of Williamson’s program is take it as an invitation to explore
mechanisms (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998), that is, causal connections that may or may not
be triggered in specific situations,  rather than for searching for general regularities.  To be
more concrete, it is a call for exploring how a specific manifestation of BR  such as, say,
reference level biases  translate into transaction costs confronted by agents in a specific
setting, and how this influences the contract or governance structure chosen by these agents to
regulate their trade. This is not necessarily to say that one ends up with a mass of extremely
partial models of strongly limited applicability.  Insights of rather general applicability may
follow.13  In particular new insights will be produced and old puzzles may be resolved.14 As a
loose example of what such a program may look like, I next consider a small subset of the
kind of psychological work I have in mind and then briefly explore some consequences for
economic organization.
Biases to Rationality, Cognition, and Preferences
Increasingly, the massive and rapidly accumulating literature in cognitive science, cognitive
and social psychology and experimental economics on biases to rationality, cognition and
preferences has been not only cited by economists, but also increasingly used (see Rabin, 1998
for a survey).  Strictly speaking, not all of this literature is about BR.  For example, work in
psychology and experimental economics on “social” (i.e., other-regarding) preferences may lie
outside the orbit of BR. On the other hand, much of the literature exclusively concerns
cognitive issues, such as the systematic violations of the standard theory of behavior under
                                                          
13 For example, Babcock and Loewenstein (1998) argue that self-serving biases are likely to be a very
frequent determinant of a specific type of transaction costs, namely bargaining impasse.
14 For example, in many work situations, precise signals on output are available, yet monitoring still
takes place.  Office workers may thus be supervised although it is trivial to count the number of forms
they have processed at the end of the day.  It seems unrealistic to argue that some random and
unobservable factor should intervene in the work process, shifting too much risk on to the agent
(Lippman and Rumelt, 1991).  A more realistic explanation is lack of self-discipline in the performance
of a boring job (Rabin, 1998)
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uncertainty that real people engage in.  This literature would be considered by most to be
directly about BR.  However, in actuality the boundaries between cognition and preference are
blurred, and an important part of the literature lies on those blurred boundaries (e.g., March,
1999).15  In a sense, this is not surprising.  If one thinks generally of BR as an imperfect ability
to perceive, learn about, compare, remember, and order alternatives (cf. Witt, 1996), “strange”
(e.g., time variant or context dependent) preferences are to be expected. For example, March
(1996) argues that the fact that people exhibit greater risk aversion for gains than for losses in
many situations (i.e., a risk preference) may reflect accumulated learning (i.e., a cognitive
activity) rather than given utility functions.16 Thus, in the following, I deliberately and rather
indiscriminately mix preference and cognition when discussing various manifestations of thick
BR. Here is a telegraphically stated and arguably incomplete catalogue of biases that, I shall
argue, are most obviously relevant to the understanding of economic organization.
The availability heuristic  that is, people tend to think that events are more probable if they
can recall incidents of their occurrence.  An example is that people typically think that more
words, on any given page, will end with the letters “ing” than have “n” as the second-to-last
letter (although clearly this is not possible). The availability heuristic has been argued to be
particular relevant to the understanding of risk assessments (Sunstein, 1999), particularly since
the availability heuristic implies that risk assessments are likely to be strongly conditioned by
social, particularly informational, forces.
Reference level biases  this is a family of biases that includes loss aversion (aka the status
quo bias), the endowment effect, the diminishing sensitivity bias, and the self-serving bias.
Common to these is that they all involve a reference point. The most basic one is arguably loss
aversion.  Under loss aversion, a loss relative to the status quo is seen as more undesirable
than a gain relative to the same status quo is seen as desirable. A closely related bias is the
endowment effect, that is, once a person comes to possess a good, he will value it more than
before he possessed it.  Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) empirically examine the
implication of the standard assumptions of economic theory that (when income effects are 0 or
small) a person’s maximum willingness to pay for a good should be roughly the same as the
minimum compensation demanded for the same good.  They find that contrary to theoretical
expectation and controlling for strategic behavior and transaction costs, there are systematic
differences between these numbers, in the sense that when people are given goods their
valuation of those goods increases strongly and instantaneously. The diminishing sensitivity
bias implies that the marginal effects of changes in well being are greater when change is close
to one’s reference level than for changes farther away (Rabin, 1998).  Finally, the self-serving
bias is essentially the conflation of what is fair with what benefits oneself (Babcock and
Loewenstein, 1997).   Thus, people systematically overestimate their own contribution to joint
tasks.
                                                          
15 In his overview paper, Rabin (1998) explicitly tries to distinguish relevant psychological
contributions on the basis of whether they relate to “biases in judgment” (i.e., cognition) or to
“preferences.”  However, as he admits, the distinction is far from watertight; for example, framing
effects  “… may in fact partially determine a person’s preferences (1998, p.37; emph. in original).
16 The relation between “strange” preferences and cognition is further explored in March (1999), where
a key point is that ambiguity in preferences can foster organizational learning.
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Adaptive preferences  that is, the phenomenon that preferences, such as risk preferences
(March and Shapira, 1992; March, 1996), adapt to experience in a manner that roughly
corresponds to people coming to prefer what they experience. This may produce intertemporal
inconsistency in revealed choices.  Adaptive preferences are evidently closely related to
reference level biases, and may to some extent be seen as a dynamic version of reference level
biases.
Preference reversal  that is, the quite pervasive phenomenon that people are inconsistent
when considering two gambles of equal expected value, one gamble having a high probability
of winning a moderate stake and the other a low probability of winning a larger stake.  The
finding is that many persons who prefer the former over the latter when required to choose
between gambles, actually put a higher minimum selling price on the latter than the former,
when they are asked to evaluate the very same gambles.   Preference reversal may be seen as
an instance of a broader class of biases, namely framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman,
1986), which refers to the general phenomenon that people often lack stable preferences that
are robust to different ways of eliciting those preferences (Rabin, 1998).
Biases in the Context of Economic Organization
As Williamson (1998) argues, biases to rationality, cognition, and preferences are mitigated to
some extent by organization.  This is because organization has recourse to specialization,
which allows for economizing with cognitive effort.  That does not make these biases
irrelevant to the study of organization.  On the contrary, since specialization cannot cope with
all biases, recourse to additional organizational measures is likely to be necessary.  In order to
see this, it is necessary to inquire into how biases affect economic organization.   One take on
this issue is to think of biases  as influencing economic outcomes because they influence
bargaining games (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).
They may be viewed as determinants of bargaining outcomes on par with asymmetric
information, strategic behavior and time preference.
To be slightly more concrete, what people believe that they deserve in a bargaining situation
may be subject to reference level biases.   In turn, reference levels may change over time as a
result of the phenomenon of adaptive preference (e.g., in a repeated bargaining situation).  The
comparisons people make when evaluating their gains and losses from bargaining, and how
they evaluate the same offers in different contexts (e.g., as made by different people), may be
subject to framing effects.  In the context of economic organization, biases may thus influence
how much employees expect to capture of the firm’s surplus (and therefore how much they are
going to invest in augmenting their human capital), how competitive threats are perceived,
how the gains from trade in inputs markets will be shared, etc. In the context of economic
organization, biases may influence both explicit contract terms and the bargaining games that
take place in the context of relations where contracting is incomplete (i.e., ex post
renegotiation games).  The ramifications are clearly many and complicated; only a few will be
considered here.
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Example 1: Loss aversion, employee expectations and strategic change.  In order to spell out
some implications of loss aversion, imagine a dramatic change in corporate strategy so that the
focal firm withdraws from a number of markets, downsizing and concentrating on core
business. Of course, many employees in addition to those that may be laid off will suffer a loss
of utility as a result of this.  Since the change is likely to be at least partly negotiated between
the various stakeholders of the firm, management and owners are likely to offer various side-
payments to reduce these losses of utility.  Strategic behavior is likely to complicate the
ensuing bargaining. However, the phenomena of loss aversion and adaptive preferences are
likely to further complicate bargaining games.
First, loss aversion implies that the proposed strategic change will involve a mixture of painful
losses and less-pleasurable gains so that people will tend to resist change.  Inertia is predicted
by loss-aversion alone. Second, in an employee relationship, employees develop implicit and
explicit expectations to the contract governing the relationship, and particularly to the benefits
that they believe they deserve under the implicit contract, that is, their “entitlements” (Heath et
al., 1993). There is psychological evidence that people tend to be systematically biased in their
estimates of their entitlements.  More specifically, these are perceived as richer (people think
they contribute more than they do) and more systematic (because rare events are often given
probability zero, the consistency of others’ behavior is over-estimated) than they would be to a
neutral observer (idem.).  The combined implication of loss aversion and the development of
expectations with respect to entitlements is that side-payments are likely to be much larger
than an “objective” evaluation would suggest.
Various implications follow.  First, the economics of organization implicitly claims that
organizations are plastic. Notions of complementarily between elements of the organization
(Holmström and Milgrom, 1994) and strategic behavior may complicate this, but provided that
organizations can be changed in a systemic fashion and informational asymmetries do not pose
too much of a problem, there should not be any remaining problems of organizational change.
However, the phenomena of loss aversion and adaptive preferences are relevant mechanisms
that may cause substantial organizational inertia and make organizational change more costly
than an organizational economics analysis would indicate. Thus, although alternatives to
existing organizational arrangements can be imagined, the set of alternatives that can be
implemented with net gains is further circumscribed.    The other side of the coin of adaptive
preferences and loss aversion suggest is that an important part of ex post governance is the
management of the formation of the expectations of those agents with which the firm bargains
over inputs and outputs.  The ultimate sharing of value will not just be a matter of the
“objective” contribution of each agent, but will also reflect players’ perception of their
“legitimate” entitlements.  Management and leadership have an important role in influencing
those perceptions.
Example 2: Leadership behavior and the availability heuristic.  The previous example
indicates that an implication of the combined effects of loss aversion and adaptive preferences
is to make any status quo salient.  However, the availability heuristic may counteract that
tendency. The fact that the availability heuristic is likely to be very strongly socially
conditioned only helps here.  For example, public announcements by a CEO that the
competitive situation faced by the firm is threatening may create informational externalities,
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because the announcement is taken as a relevant signal by employees.  When there is little
information about the true state of competition, such externalities may create informational
cascades (Sunstein, 1999).  If further this announcement is combined with a call for wage
reductions, there is potentially ample room for the kind of employer opportunism discussed by
Dow (1987) but neglected in most of the economics of organization.  Thus, one possible
application of the availability heuristic is to broaden the role of opportunism in organizational
economics.
Example 3: Context-dependent risk-preference. An implication of preference reversal and
adaptive preferences is that risk-preference is likely to be context-dependent.  Specifically,
March and Shapira (1992) argue that risk-taking is influenced by danger (threats to survival),
slack (more slack leads to more risk-taking), aspiration levels (people are risk-seeking under
the target level and risk-averse above), whose resources are at risk, and past experience.   This
suggests that the efficiency of incentive contracts, which partly relies on shifting risks between
parties, is context dependent, and that some kinds of incentive contracts may in some contexts
have perverse consequences.  For example, consider a firm that not only falls much below its
own aspiration levels, but also begins to confront difficulties with sales, and ultimately of
paying creditors.   In this situation, managers may, because of the context-dependence of risk
preference, want to assume more risk than would be sensible to a neutral observer.  If they
have been equipped with incentive contracts in the form of golden parachutes, their incentives
to actually assume excess risks will be strengthened (Shapira, 2000).   Incentive contracts that
have not been designed with an eye to the context-dependence of risk-preference may
therefore misstate the “true” risk-allocation inherent in the contract, given the various states of
nature that may be realized.
Example 4: Groups and Organization Design.  The use of group-based decision-making is an
increasingly important aspect of modern organization.  Arguably, the use of groups is partly
determined by the phenomenon which social psychologists have pointed to numerous times
(e.g., Cooke and Kernaghan, 1987), namely that group decisions differ from individual
decisions in an organizational context and that groups can change the behavior of their
members.  The positive aspect of this is that groups may give rise to distinct synergies,
stemming from improved problem-solving. The improved problem-solving that is available to
teams/groups has been strongly emphasized in the Total Quality Management movement
(Jensen and Wruck, 1994).  Thus, adherents of TQM advocate extensive delegation of
decision rights to groups to promote a closer co-location of decision rights and specific, local
knowledge and a faster and more efficient decision-making process.
Although group interaction may thus yield certain types of informational rents, a rich literature
in social psychology indicates that groups have biases of their own.  The costs associated with
such biases may offset potential benefits.  For example, an apparently rather robust
phenomenon is the “risk-shift phenomenon” in which group compromise leads to the adoption
of a most risky common view (Mullins, 1996).  This may well be related to what Janis (1972)
famously described as “groupthink,” that is, the tendency of the sharing of mental models to
lead to incomplete surveys of alternatives and objectives and failures to fully examine the risks
of available alternatives, in turn leading to excessive optimism and risk-taking and a
suppression of “heretic” ideas.
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Organizational economists have known at least since Alchian and Demsetz (1972) that
groups/teams may fall victim to free-rider problems, and that this may help explaining aspects
of the organization of firms.  As the above indicates, free-rider problems are not the only
problems of the “disaggregation of corporations” (Zenger and Hesterly, 1997) in smaller
teams, an increasingly widespread practice (idem).  Among the relevant costs of increased
disaggregation are the potential costs of promoting groupthink-phenomena within
groups/teams (although this may mean that corporation-wide groupthink may be reduced).
Many other similar examples could be constructed based on the many cognitive biases that
have not been reported here.17 Moreover, it would also be possible to examine implications for
other aspects of economic organization than internal organization.  However, the examples
hopefully to indicate the main thrust of the argument: It is possible to tell stories about
economic organization that pay more attention to work in cognitive psychology insights, but
still does not fundamentally break with explanatory fundamentals of organizational
economics.  Specifically, the above examples indicate that this kind of research may enrichen
the understanding of the sources of organizational inertia and the barriers to organizational
change, the analysis of opportunism, the design of incentive contracts, and organizational
design.  In a wider sense, a thick BR approach means that more determinants of transaction
costs, perhaps particularly those that relate more to bounded rationality than to opportunism,
are identified.
4. Discussion: Transaction Costs, Efficiency and Social Learning
Where does all this leave us with respect to the presumed efficiency properties of alternative
governance structures?18  One response may be to argue that it merely adds extra dimensions
to the comparative contracting approach, refining the understanding of issues such as the
remediability criterion (Williamson, 1996,  chapter 9), managerial opportunism, and the
sources of transaction costs and contractual incompleteness.  However, the basic theoretical
structure is not affected. That conclusion is, however, too facile.   For example, farsighted
contracting  at least in the strict sense of involving rational expectations and subjective
utility maximization will not survive confrontation with findings from cognitive
psychology, reviving Dow’s (1987) argument that in the presence of BR, agents cannot be
expected to choose efficient contracts and governance structures on an ex ante basis. The
inclusion of behavioral variables that are likely to be endogenous to incentives and managerial
actions clearly adds more complexity to the (dynamic) optimization problem, making it even
                                                          
17 Examples may include the effect of frequent performance evalution on the framing of decision
situations and the effect of framing on risk preferences.  See Payne (1997), Camerer (1998) and Shapira
(2000) for inspiring discussions of the implications of cognitive psychology for organizational decision
making.
18 For a particularly thoughtful discussion of the difficulties of giving meaning to efficiency when BR is
taken seriously, see Furubotn (1999).
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more unlikely that boundedly rational people can choose efficient structures.19 Moreover, an
implication of making room for richer conceptions of BR is (as we have seen) that the
assumption of organizational plasticity becomes untenable, making it even more implausible
that efficient governance structures can be implemented by boundedly rational designers.  On
the other hand, this provides the basic condition, namely rigidity of behaviors, for processes of
natural selection to operate.  However, natural selection explanations neither say much about
where the varieties of economic organization come from, nor about how decisions actually
made on the level of the firm influence the process of selection.
While the efficiency-from-design argument is implausible and natural selection explanations
are typically uninformative about managerial choice, there is another way in which the
emphasis on economizing and efficiency perspective characteristic of organizational
economics may be defended, even when rich models of BR are taken into consideration,
namely social learning models.  Arguably, social learning explanations appeal less to
economists than intentional or natural selection explanations for the same reason that
economists are traditionally reluctant to draw on thick BR models of behavior: The
disciplinary distance seems too large (but see Witt, 1996).  However, there are reasons to
revisit social learning explanations, because they provide mechanisms explaining how hitherto
successful (not necessarily efficient in any strict sense) governance structures or contract
designs may diffuse (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997).
In the perhaps most cited contribution to field, Bandura (1977) went beyond simple stimulus-
response or imitation schemes of individual learning and argued that while agents try to
emulate the successful actions and avoid the failures of other agents, they do so through
sophisticated processes of interpretation and reflection that lead to the construction of models
of behavior that are useful for interpreting concrete situations and acting in these.  A particular
important factor in relational modeling in social interaction is represented by symbols of all
kinds (including shared typifications), which represent not only focal points (in the game
theoretic sense), but also repositories of values and beliefs.  Symbolic processes thus allow
agents to develop models of behavior that are more generally applicable than the models
developed from direct learning from observation.  For example, relational modeling is
facilitated by the existence of symbols because symbols provide already produced categories
into which other agents or experiences may be placed.
There are many reasons why the basic point in social learning theories  namely, that
individual learning and choice behavior is very strongly conditioned by processes of social
comparison   is particularly applicable to an understanding of processes of design of certain
governance structures or contract designs.  A basic premise is that governance structures and
contract designs are chosen by managers, (possibly in some sort of cooperative relation with
owners/boards of directors.  However, the activities of managers are very much relational and
representational (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997),  Representing the interests of others (owners, the
                                                          
19 Contrary to what Moore (1992) thinks, the inability to perform dynamic programming does not
necessarily mean that the analysis breaks down.  For example, agents may still be able to choose
governance structures or contracts based on their perception that the relevant payoffs exceed some
treshold level (as in Simon 1955).
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business unit, etc.), typically to others who are also engaged in representational activities,
requires great skill in the modeling of those whose interests are represented and of those to
whom the representation is directed.  The team-based nature and the strong emphasis on
mutual consent in managerial work represent further reason for it being inherently
representational and relational.  Finally, because of considerations of BR, management relies
on low cost ways of learning, particularly observing and interpreting the actions of other firms,
and relying on intermediaries, such as consulting firms, consulting academics, trade
associations, etc. who are essentially brokers in symbolized experiences.  Such learning takes
place with respect to products, production methods, organization, ways of dealing with public
authorities, etc.   A highly relevant aspect of learning about organization is that there are no
legal barriers to imitative action (in contrast to the case of products); one cannot protect a
specific governance structure, internal organization or contract design by means of intellectual
property rights.
While it is conceivable that boundedly rational managers may indeed discover
successful/profitable governance structures through experimental processes, these are likely to
be costly and lengthy, and arguably only successful under stationary or near-stationary
conditions (Dow, 1987). Observing and interpreting the outcomes of other firms’ experiments
with organizational forms are likely to be comparatively low cost ways of gaining access to
experience.  Thus, the diffusion of governance structures, etc. may take place through such
processes of social comparison.  This provides some assurance for claiming that types of
economic organization that “work” (e.g., seem to lead to increases in profits relative to
observed alternatives) will actually be adopted.20
5. Conclusion
The economics of organization has explored only a tiny fraction of the many ramifications of
BR.  However, the present use of BR is less than satisfactory.  BR seems to be neither
necessary, nor sufficient in the economics of organization, where its main role increasingly
seems to be purely rhetorical.   While it is easy to criticize the treatment of BR in the
economics of organization, concrete remedies are harder to devise.  I have suggested that
certain portions of the cognitive psychology literature may be promising. In particular,
attention has been drawn to the cognitive biases literature.  Many of these biases are well
established in experimental research and have rather direct implications for organization and
contract design. More specifically, they allow for an empirically grounded understanding of a
neglected set of contractual hazards and frictions, and therefore a richer understanding of the
determinants of transaction costs. By means of exemplification, I have argued that such an
approach has real implications for economic organization, more specifically internal
organization.  Because of space limitations, implications for issues relating to the boundaries
                                                          
20 However, as Dow (1987) rightly insisted there can be no presumption that processes of social
learning lead to efficient outcomes with any degree of automaticity.  First, the symbolic nature of social
learning means that certain types of economic organization may be more salient than others. The
availability heuristic may reinforce this.  The implications are that efficient alternatives may not be
imitated, and, hence, not diffuse, and that salient types of economic organization may be applied to
transactions for which they are basically not suited.  Second, as Dow argued path-dependency may
arise, specifically informational cascades may lead to widespread adoption of inefficient alternatives,
even in the presence of intelligent learning.
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and existence of firms, and wider issues of contract design, have not been developed.  Future
work will address these issues.
20
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